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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT     COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
_________________________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of




For a Judgment pursuant to Article 78 INDEX #2016-0051
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules,
-against-






This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Paul E. Benjamin, verified on January 14, 2016 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s Office on January 27, 2016.  Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Mid-State Correctional Facility, is challenging the October 2014 determination denying his
discretionary parole release and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months.  The
Court issued an Order to Show Cause on February 19, 2016, and an Amended Order to
Show Cause on March 16, 2016, and has received and reviewed respondents’ Answer and
Return verified on May 14, 2016, including confidential Exhibit C.  The Court has also
received and reviewed the petitioner’s reply dated May 25, 2016 and filed with the Franklin
County Clerk on June 2, 2016.  
On September 23, 1987, Petitioner was sentenced by the Tioga County Court to an
indeterminate term of incarceration of twenty (20) years to life upon the conviction of
Murder in the Second Degree.  He was received into the custody of the Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter referred to as “DOCCS”) on December
11,1987 and made his initial appearance before a Parole Board on December 2006.  The
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petitioner has reappeared before the Parole Board in December 2008, October 2010 and
October 2012.  At each appearance, the petitioner was denied parole release and put on 24
month holds.  The petitioner again appeared before the Parole Board on October 1,2014. 
Following that appearance, Petitioner was denied discretionary parole release and it was
directed that he be held for an additional 24 months.  The parole denial determination reads
as follows:
“Denied hold 24 months.  Next appearance, 10/2016.
After a review of the record and interview, the panel has
determined that if released at this time, your release would not
be compatible with the welfare of society.  The Board has
considered all required statutory factors including your risk to
society, criminogenic needs for successful re-entry, release
plans and institutional adjustment.  More compelling, however,
is the extreme and disturbing violence you exhibited in the I.O.
as well as your callous disregard for the victim and sanctity of
human life.  The victim in the I.O. was shot in the head by you. 
After you shot her, you placed her body in a 55-gallon drum
and put pig manure around her body.  You then lived in the
victim’s home and build a deck over her dead body.  This crime
was a continuation and severe escalation of a pattern of illegal
conduct.  Since your last Board interview you incurred a Tier II
infraction for creating a disturbance.  During the interview you
had very little grasp on the gravity and magnitude of this
heinous crime.  The Board notes the length of time you have
served, your work as a mobility assistant, completion of ART,
vocational accomplishments, work assignments and
information from the community missions transitional
program.  All factors considered, your release at this time
would deprecate the serious nature of the offense as to
undermine respect for the law.” 
An administrative appeal from the October 2014 parole denial determination was
filed on petitioner’s behalf to the DOCCS Board of Parole Appeals Unit on March 12, 2015. 
On or about September 9, 2015, the parole denial determination was affirmed.  This
proceeding ensued.
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Preliminarily, the respondents object as a matter of law to the timeliness of the
petition.  The petitioner received a copy of the final decision of the Board of Parole Appeals
Unit on September 24, 2015.  As such, the four month statute of limitations pursuant to
CPLR §217(1) began to run on the date of service and the last day for the petitioner to
commence an Article 78 proceeding challenging the determination was January 24, 2016. 
In this instance, the petition was received by the Franklin County Clerk’s Office on January
27, 2016.
“It is undisputed that the papers necessary to commence the instant
CPLR article 78 proceeding were received by the Clerk's office after the
expiration of the four-month statute of limitations, which began to run when
petitioner acquired notice of the determination. Inasmuch as the proceeding
was clearly untimely, the petition was properly dismissed. Although
petitioner claims that he deposited the papers in the prison mail system prior
to the expiration of the statute of limitations, this does not constitute
sufficient compliance with the statutory requirements (internal citations
omitted).” Purcell v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1128, 1128–29 citing Grant v.
Senkowski, 95 NY2d 605, 608-609.
In the matter at bar, the petitioner failed to timely file the petition and the petition
must be dismissed.  Notwithstanding same, the remaining arguments proffered by the
petitioner are addressed herein.
Petitioner alleges that the respondents failed to consider the statutory factors
contained in Executive Law §259-i(c)(A) and only focused on the petitioner’s underlying
crime.  The petitioner further alleges that the Parole Board failed to specify the reasons for
denial and he asserts that the denial was predetermined by the members of the Parole
Board.  The petitioner argues that he will never be granted parole based upon the Parole
Board’s reliance solely on the nature of the instant offense and the Parole Board refused to
advise him what, if anything, he would need to do for future appearances before the Board.
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Respondents argue that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
relating to certain claims contained in the petition.  Specifically, the respondents argue that
these arguments raised in this petition were not raised in the appeal to the Board of Parole
Appeals Unit.  In such appeal, Thomas G. Soucia, Esq., Public Defender, argued that the
Parole Board failed to consider any of the petitioner’s positive programming while
incarcerated and solely focused on the nature of the offense.  As such, the respondents’
assertion that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies pertaining to the new
arguments is correct.
Executive Law §259-i(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §§38-f
and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a
reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but
after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law. In
making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted pursuant to
subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall
require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional record including
program goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and interactions with staff
and inmates; ... (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services available to the
inmate; ... (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the
type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing
court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence
probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and aggravating
factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement; and (viii) prior
criminal record, including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to
any previous probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement.”
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Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259-
i(5)) unless there had been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See
Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470; Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119
AD3d 1268; Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. 
Unless the Petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary,” the Court
must presume that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance
with statutory requirements.  See Jackson v. Evans, 118 AD3d 701, Nankervis v.
Dennison, 30 AD3d 521 and Zane v. New York State Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848.
The petition focuses upon the argument that the Parole Board failed to
adequately consider/properly weigh all of the required statutory factors and instead
relied excessively on the nature of the crimes underlying Petitioner’s incarceration as
well as his prior criminal record.  However, in his testimony before the Parole Board,
petitioner added new details regarding the instant offense including how he put the
victim’s dead body in her car with a beer can in her hands to make her appear to be
intoxicated as the petitioner attempted to drive her car to New York City to dispose of
the body.  Resp. Ex. G, p. 5-6.  Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim twice in the
head, although the second shot was termed as a “mercy shooting”, left her dead body in
her bed for two days, then buried her body in the backyard in a 55 gallon barrel
surrounded by pig manure to mask the smell of a rotting corpse before building a gazebo
over the gravesite to hide the remains.  Nonetheless, the petitioner still blamed the
victim stating:
“I just want you to know I never meant to harm Margie.  I should
have just grabbed the rifle and knocked her out instead of trying to get the
gun.  At least if I’d been out there, she would have bought me a trailer by
now.  I really miss her.  Don’t think I’m not haunted by Margie because I
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am.  If I had a chance to talk to her right now, I’d say why did you do what
you did? Why? I don’t know why she did it.”  Resp. Ex. G, p.14.
A Parole Board need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required
to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to
expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision.  See Montane v. Evans, 116
AD3d 197; see also Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and Martin v. New York State
Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152.  As noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department,
the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination
 “. . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant
factors, but only whether the Board followed the statutory guidelines and
rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted, by the facts
in the record.  Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing process,
given that it is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each
factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior
(internal citations omitted).”  Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole,
68 AD3d 1295, 1296.
In the case at bar, reviews of the Parole Board Report and transcript of Petitioner’s
October 1, 2014- Parole Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it information
with respect to the appropriate statutory factors, including Petitioner’s educational and
therapeutic programming records, COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment Instrument,
sentencing minutes, disciplinary record and letters of support regarding release, as well as
information with respect to the circumstances of the crimes underlying his incarceration
and prior criminal record.  The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the hearing transcript to
suggest that the Parole Board denied the Petitioner an opportunity to answer questions or
provide insight into how and why he believed that he would be a good candidate for release. 
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Indeed, the Petitioner admitted he killed the victim, buried her body and continued to live
in the victim’s residence for a few months before he was arrested.  Yet, based upon the
petitioner’s testimony, it did not appear that the petitioner understood the seriousness of
his actions.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors.  See Pearl v. New York State Division of
Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828.  Since the requisite statutory
factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of the discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety as a result
of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying Petitioner’s
incarceration and that the petitioner still displayed “very little grasp on the gravity and
magnitude of this heinous crime”.  See Neal v. Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320 and Confoy v. New
York State Division of Parole, 173 AD2d 1014; see also Graziano v. Evans, 90 AD3d 1367,
1369[“while the Board may not consider[ ] factors outside the scope of the applicable
statute, including penal philosophy’, it can consider factors—such as remorse and insight
into the offense—that are not enumerated in the statute but nonetheless relevant to an
assessment of whether an inmate ‘present[s] a danger to the community.’”]
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.
Dated: August 16, 2016 at
Indian Lake, New York. __________________________      
        S. Peter Feldstein
   Acting Supreme Court Justice  
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